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26 February 1982

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ARMED FORCES

NEED FOR ATTENTION TO SERVICEMEN'S LETTERS STRESSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 81 (signed to press 5 Nov 81) pp 3-7

[Editorial: "Attention to a Letter is Sensitivity for a Person"]

[Text] The Communist Party and its Central Committee, in constantly following Lenin's traditions, have given unflagging attention to worker letters. The party sees in them a most important channel for a vital link with the masses and one of the most reliable and valuable sources of information.

The letters received by the staffs and political bodies, by the editorial staffs of the military newspapers and magazines from the troop units, subunits and enterprises convincingly show the unanimous approval and strong support by the Army and Navy personnel for the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. They are proof of the political activeness of the servicemen, the members of their families and the employees of the Soviet Army and Navy in solving arising problems and in combating shortcomings.

The 26th Party Congress pointed to the enormous importance of the workers' letters and proposals. Its demand for a responsive and attentive attitude toward letters was specifically expressed in the Decree adopted this year by the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Further Strengthen Work with Worker Letters and Proposals in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress." The Central Committee has re-emphasized that all ranks of leaders bear particular responsibility for the state of affairs in this most important area of work.

The party's decisions and instructions lie at the basis of the handling of letters by the military councils, the commanders, the Army and Navy political bodies and party organizations. The forms and methods of handling the letters and the organization of receiving visitors are being improved everywhere and significant positive experience has been gained.

The state of work with letters is regularly discussed at the sessions of military councils of the armed services, military districts, groups of forces and fleets. For example, recently at a session of the Ground Forces Military Council, a report was heard by the military council member and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Siberian Military District, Lt Gen N. Kizyun. A preliminary check on the spot and the discussion at the session showed that a good deal had been done in this district to improve the handling of letters.

Many commanders and political workers have begun to more carefully study the problems brought up in the letters, to more objectively assess the state of affairs in the units and subunits and to show greater tenacity in carrying out the proposals and critical comments voiced by the servicemen, the employees, members of their families and other citizens.

The Ground Troops Political Directorate maintains unflagging control over the work carried out by the commanders, political bodies and staffs to fulfill the requirements of the 26th Party Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the handling of letters. It regularly informs them of the most important conclusions stemming from an analysis of warnings and statements and sends reviews of the letters to the troops.

The military commissariats have also begun to show more sensitivity and attention to people. There has been an improvement in the review and resolution of requests and statements from disabled persons and veterans of the Great Patriotic War and serviceman family members.

The Navy has also shown effective work to carry out the requirements of the 26th Party Congress on attention to worker letters and proposals. The question of organizational and political work in the Navy to further improve the handling of letters and proposals in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress this year was reviewed at a session of the Navy Military Council. Specific measures have been outlined and are being implemented to further improve the review of letters and organize the receiving of visitors.

The state of handling letters has been studied in a number of formations of the Northern, Pacific and Black Sea fleets. Here chief attention has been given to the greatest possible rise in the personal responsibility of the command and military political personnel for reviewing the letters, for organizing the receiving of visitors and for generalizing and introducing positive experience.

In the formations, ships and units it has become a practice to systematically check on the state of this work and to hear reports by the commanders and political workers. The proposals and critical comments contained in the letters and statements have begun to be more fully considered in carrying out the tasks of combat readiness, combat and political training, in organizing indoctrination and training of the personnel, in everyday life, in preparing official documents, in eliminating shortcomings and in assessing the work of command and political personnel.

The Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District has acquired positive experience in handling letters. In the district staff departments and directorates officers have been assigned who are responsible for carrying out the decisions taken on the letters. The district political directorate has adopted a number of measures to strengthen the responsibility of the communists for a responsive and conscientious attitude toward the letter writers. A good deal has been done so that the propagandizing of the current legislation, the constitutional obligations and rights of the servicemen and the combined-arms regulations is more effective and purposeful and so that legal knowledge schools are operating everywhere.

The editors of the district, group and fleet newspapers are doing extensive work with the letters. In many of them volunteer reception rooms have been opened and

non-T/O legal propaganda departments are operating. The newspapers constantly print critical letters and decisions on them and also provide legal advice.

However, the reorganization in the handling of the letters in light of the demands of the 26th Party Congress and the Central Committee decree on this question has not been carried out everywhere with the required completeness. Many shortcomings occur where the commanders and political bodies, although carrying out a number of measures, in their daily activities still do not give sufficient attention to indoctrinating the necessary responsibility in the leadership for handling the letters, complaints and statements.

In a number of instances, the lack of great exactingness on the leadership for this area of work has led to the manifestation of an inattentive and at times callous attitude in some of them to the letters and complaints. Repeat letters prove this.

Here are some examples. The serviceman Yu. Leynek informed the unit commander that in certain training subunits the number of outstanding men in combat and political training and outstanding squads and platoons had artificially been overstated. In summing up the training results, the examination grades of certain officer candidates were adjusted to the obligations assumed by them. Having received such information, the unit commander seemingly should have drawn the proper conclusions immediately and dealt strictly with the guilty parties. However, everything remained as before. The author sent a letter to the central authorities. The superior body carefully verified the designated facts on the spot. The warning was affirmed. The parties guilty of the deceit were punished. But this could have been stopped before.

Lt Col (Res) E. Tsadikov turned to a political body on the question of shortcomings in personnel work in a troop unit. His statement was not listened to on the spot. The author had to turn to Moscow. The appropriate measures were adopted following the officer's letter.

But the very fact of a repeat action, as is known, is already a signal of serious flaws in the work.

The military commissariats continue to receive a large number of letters. The veterans of the Great Patriotic War, retired and reserve generals and officers and the members of serviceman families write on various questions. Unfortunately, here they do not always show the proper responsibility to their requests.

In May 1980, Lt Col (Res) B. Likhachev sent a letter to the Pervomayskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Rostov-na-Donu with a request to confirm his length of service. Workers at the rayon military commissariat twice promised to forward the request to the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. But this was not done. In January 1981, the officer himself went to the military commissariat and only then was the request forwarded. In May he received a reply. Thus, it took a whole year for basically settling the question.

A significant number of written and oral requests are received on personnel questions. These are requests for registration, service moves and extending the length of service in the Army and Navy ranks. But the commanders, the political and personnel bodies not everywhere show the proper tact and sensitivity to examining such letters.

Of course, not each request can be satisfied now. Not every demand is valid. But in any instance the people have the right to know why. In any instance the leader must provide an accurate and thorough reply as to when or under what conditions one or another proposal could be carried out, and if not, then why.

Not everywhere has a situation of intolerance been created for instances of an inattentive attitude toward the written and oral requests of servicemen and other citizens. Sometimes individual officials, upon receiving critical letters, first of all endeavor to find shortcomings in the author himself who has "washed his linen in public," instead of effectively analyzing and taking the required measures on the letter's essence.

There still are instances of forwarding letters to subordinate levels, although for many of them a decision could be taken in the superior body. There are also cases of sending complaints and statements to the officials whose actions are being contested. The Soviet Army employee, Comrade Romankov, turned to the chief of the Grozny Garrison with a complaint about the chief of the rayon KECh [billeting and maintenance section]. Instead of reviewing the complaint at a session of the garrison housing commission, it was forwarded to the same KECh chief whose actions were being contested. Naturally, the reply from him was the same as it had been before. Certain commanders, political bodies and staffs do not always study the handling of letters in the course of regular inspections. At times the quarterly inspections are conducted superficially and formally. The statements of the internal inspection commissions sometimes reflect only the number of letters and from whom they have been received but do not go into the factors which gave rise to the complaints and statements.

There must be a serious improvement in the analysis of letters describing the state of combat readiness, the moral atmosphere in the collectives and ideological indoctrination. Individual political bodies and staff party organizations have not introduced the practice of a periodic discussion of the conclusions stemming from letter analysis over certain periods with the subsequent adopting of the necessary measures.

There are also shortcomings in the legal indoctrination of the personnel. At times the commanders and chiefs out of ignorance violate the laws and other enforceable enactments and permit major mistakes in decisions relating to letters, statements and complaints. In a number of units and military institutions, particularly the rayon military commissariats, there are no legal knowledge corners and visitor rooms have not been set up.

The editors of the district, group and fleet newspapers do not utilize all the opportunities for increasing the level of work with the letters, statements and proposals. In some of them there has been little organization of the volunteer reception rooms. The editors do not always show tenacity in adopting the proper measures on the spot relating to critical materials.

The USSR minister of defense has demanded that the commanders and superiors view the handling of letters and the receiving of visitors as one of the major areas of their service activities and to discuss these questions at sessions of the military councils, at assemblies, meetings and gatherings conducted by the commanders and political workers. There must be a profound understanding and observance by each commander and chief of Leninist principles in handling the letters and receiving visitors,

it is essential to increase their responsibility for the attentive, professional and conscientious review of letters and verbal requests and to instill a respectful attitude for the people, their opinions and needs.

It is essential to improve the receiving of servicemen and other citizens in the troop units, institutions, military schools, enterprises and organizations. For this it is essential everywhere to create conditions for receiving the visitors and provide a convenient time for them. The receiving of servicemen and citizens is part of the duties of the commanders and chiefs who possess the rights to resolve the heart of the matter. It is important that the leadership of the districts, troop groups and fleets make it a practice to personally receive visitors when they travel through the units and formations.

The interests of the matter demand a systematic analysis and generalization of the questions raised in letters or the receiving of visitors, to disclose and eliminate the factors which cause valid complaints, particularly repeat ones, to more fully utilize the obtained information for studying the state of affairs in the troops and fleets and to improve the style and methods of work by the commanders and chiefs in maintaining combat readiness, improving the quality of the training process and strengthening military discipline.

In the political bodies and party organizations it is important in a party-correct manner to assess instances of a formal attitude toward the analysis of complaints and statements and to deal more strictly with the communists for this. We must strengthen attention to the handling of letters in the military commissariats, raise the responsibility of their coworkers for solving each verbal or written appeal by the citizens and improve the quality of legal training for the military commissariat officers and employees.

It is essential to constantly explain to the personnel the Soviet laws, the military service procedures, the benefits established for servicemen and members of their families, pay rates and other questions of concern to the men. This is not a one-shot matter. Each year the Army and Navy receive new recruits. For this reason it would be beneficial to more fully utilize all forms of legal propaganda, reference materials, collections and pamphlets, lectures and talks, question and answer meetings and legal knowledge libraries. The military lawyers, the officers of the rear bodies and other specialists must be more widely involved in this work.

The military press plays an important role in handling the letters of the servicemen, the members of their families and the Soviet Army employees. The editors of the district, group and fleet newspapers must systematically publish proposals and requests from the men and their critical comments on the most troublesome facts, they must supervise the results of examining the questions raised in them and more sharply criticize the officials who are guilty of bureaucracy and red tape in reviewing statements and complaints, who violate the procedures for receiving visitors or ignore critical actions by the press. They must regularly prepare reviews of letters and forward them to the appropriate organizations for the taking of action. They must widely take up positive experience in handling the letters and the organizing of visitor receptions. The activities of the volunteer reception rooms under the newspaper editorial offices must be improved.

Unsigned and anonymous letters are encountered in the mail of the staffs, the political bodies and the newspaper and magazine editors. There have been instances of slander in them. Our attitude toward unsigned slander is clear. The party's viewpoint of them was expressed at the 26th CPSU Congress. There should be no room for them in our life. Each well-founded proposal, statement or complaint, even if it is not signed, should be carefully examined and a just decision taken on each.

The party's demand for strictly observing the Leninist principles of handling worker letters place great demands on the military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and party organizations. They must constantly indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of a responsive, attentive attitude toward the needs and requests of the Soviet military, in a spirit of intolerance of any manifestations whatsoever of red tape and bureaucracy and in a spirit of the unswerving observance of party and state discipline.

In August of the current year, the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy discussed the report by the military council member and chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Caucasus Military District, Lt Gen F. Ishchenko on how the district troops are carrying out the demands of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Further Improve the Handling of Worker Letters and Proposals in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress."

The political directorates of the armed services, districts, troop groups and fleets must thoroughly analyze the handling of letters and verbal statements, they must eliminate the detected shortcomings and ensure the unswerving fulfillment of the demands of the 26th Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee. A careful analysis of letters on all levels of the political bodies undoubtedly will make it possible to better know the thoughts and moods of the personnel, to objectively judge the effectiveness of the decisions being taken and to disclose and eliminate shortcomings.

The handling of letters is a general state, party and, consequently, official matter and one of the vivid manifestations of socialist democracy. The more perfectly it is organized the higher the political and professional activeness of the Armed Forces personnel and the more successfully the tasks confronting the units and ships will be carried out.

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ARMED FORCES

MILITARY LAW: NEED FOR PROPER APPLICATION DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in kussian No 22, Nov 81 (signed to press 5 Nov 81) pp 54-58

[Article by Maj Gen V. Kiskov, deputy chief of the Directorate of Proceedings (Upravleniye delami) of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and Candidate of Legal Sciences, Lt Col Just V. Malykh, senior legal correspondent of the legal section of the Directorate of Proceedings of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "A Firm Knowledge of Legal Standards--The Guarantee for Successful Application of the Law"]

[Text] "I cannot say of myself that I have neglected legal training or do not fully utilize the knowledge acquired within military school. In my daily work I endeavor to strictly follow the letter of the law, I teach this to my subordinates, however, as a recent inspection showed, I have made serious mistakes. The application of the law must first of all be considered unsatisfactory. Senior comrades have suggested how to rectify the situation and on what I should focus my attention now. On this question I have been following information in newspapers and magazines and in them I have sought advice and recommendations helping to prevent mistakes analogous to those made previously."

Capt I. Nesterov, Subunit Commander

The article published below has been prepared considering the requests of Capt I. Nesterov and other officers.

A most important duty for the commanders and chiefs bearing personal responsibility to the party and government for the constant combat and mobilization readiness of the units, ships and subunits assigned to them is to ensure that all the activities of the personnel are carried out in strict accord with the current Soviet laws and military regulations. Here each solely-responsible officer must himself be a model of the correct execution of service duty and impel all his subordinates to strictly follow the letter of the law. The successful carrying out of this task depends upon a number of factors among which we must mention the crucial one, the sound legal competence of the officials.

An officer who profoundly and thoroughly studies the current legislation, who is convinced of its purposefulness and justice and who firmly knows the basic questions of military service legal regulation will never deviate from the law. He does not exceed his official powers, he promptly takes measures to eliminate factors which

contribute to the commission of the violating of military discipline and law and order and settles any legal question in precise accord with the law.

Under the conditions of energetic creative activities to update and improve legislation and to strengthen the legal basis of state and social life, when the new laws more delicately and accurately control various aspects of social relationships, it is impossible to restrict oneself to the previously studied and mastered material. Each officer must constantly add to his knowledge on the basic questions of Soviet state, administrative, financial, economic and labor socialist law. He should be completely familiar with the new military legislation, know it firmly and carry it out precisely. The system of measures established in the Armed Forces to develop an awareness of socialist law among the officers and to instill in them the skills and habits of correctly leading the troop collectives serves precisely these goals.

At present, there are provisions for the study of the principles of Soviet legislation in all the military schools and officer advanced training courses. Curriculums have been worked out and are in use and these are studied in the commander training system, at commander and political worker assemblies as well as at exercises conducted for the legal aktiv, the students of the Marxism-Leninism universities, the evening party schools and the legal knowledge schools operating under the garrison cultural and educational institutions. In accord with these curriculums, the students should thoroughly study and firmly know the following: the basic provisions of the Marxist-Leninist theory of state and law, the decisions of the CPSU on the questions of socialist legality, the requirements of the Basic Law, the USSR Constitution, the current legislation on military service, the rights and duties of servicemen, the methods and procedures for ensuring socialist legality and the principles for preventing and eradicating violations of the law. The study of all of this is not an end in itself, but rather an indispensable condition for an effective legal indoctrination impact on the students by all means and methods and primarily by the example set in carrying out service duties. Here each officer should be profoundly aware that the legal regulation of all aspects relating to the organization and activities of the subordinates as well as the unswerving fulfillment of the legal prescripts ensure the attaining of the constitutional goals confronting each man and the Armed Forces as a whole.

In concretizing the constitutional provisions, Soviet legislation reinforces the system and structure of military administrative bodies and creates an organizational and legal basis for setting up the military administrative apparatus of the Army and Navy. In defining the competence of each military administrative body, each military official and all the servicemen, the standards of Soviet law not only grant them powers needed to perform the appropriate functions but also establish the limits of their use.

Thus, the assimilation of the curriculums is a prerequisite for the successful practical application of the law. In understanding this, each officer should approach his own legal preparation with a heightened sense of responsibility. It is a question not only of the planned exercises and the mass agitation measures of a legal indoctrination nature conducted in the units and subunits but also the urgent need to independently add to legal knowledge and use every opportunity and means for this purpose.

Capt I. Nesterov whose letter was mentioned above very carefully follows the newspaper and magazine publications. As was discovered in a talk with him, the officer recently has begun to turn more frequently for advice to the military justice bodies. These practical actions can only be welcomed. At the same time it is essential to point out that in the interests of broadening legal competence, each officer can and should utilize many other opportunities.

In this regard it is essential first of all to draw attention to the procedural aids and pamphlets which are directly addressed to the commanders and political workers. Such publications in a systematized form give many legal enforceable enactments. Here, in particular, we should mention the legislation references which contain information on the procedure for citizens to carry out universal military service and on the benefits for servicemen and persons liable for military service as well as for persons discharged from military service into the reserves or retirement.

Also accessible for servicemen are the Record of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the compendiums of USSR government decrees as well as the analogous official publications by the Union republics. Of course, they are not issued to the military units and garrisons for permanent keeping. The main thing is that all servicemen and primarily the commanders and political workers can freely consult with the contents of the published legal documents.

The reviews of legal violations in the administrative activities of military officials are also a positive form for improving the legal knowledge of Army and Navy officer personnel. The announcing of these violations in the directives of the USSR minister of defense, the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, in the directives of the commanders of military districts, troop groups and fleets with the indicating of the specific factors and conditions contributing to the commission of the infractions and with instructions on the ways to eradicate them helps to increase the effectiveness of legal practices.

An essential condition for successful legal training of officer personnel is properly organized reference and consultative work in each troop unit on the orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense. In accord with the regulation, the main burden must be carried by the legal consultants and where they are not provided for under the TOE, by other skilled workers. Each military unit should have a regular copy of the orders and directives making it possible for the officers to effectively and fully study the current military legislation and to better know the legal precepts needed by them for their service activities.

Legally based legal practices contribute to an increased level of officer legal knowledge. Here an important place is given to the maintaining of firm proper order, the correct organization of alert duty and the standing of garrison, guard (atch) and interior service and to ensuring the unswerving fulfillment of the requirements of military legal enactments which regulate the accounting for, storage and operation of weapons, military equipment and supplies.

Firm proper order has the most positive effect on the legal awareness of the servicemen and helps to maintain high organization and discipline in the units and on the ships and to further raise combat readiness. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces obliges each commander (chief) to establish and maintain firm

internal order in the unit or on the ship (in the subunit), to immediately eliminate the noted infractions of service procedures and decisively eradicate any actions which can harm the combat capability of the unit, ship (subunit).

The organization of the life and activities of the troops on a basis of the laws, military regulations and orders, daily control over their execution and high demandingness on the part of superiors for subordinates combined with constant concern for them indoctrinate the servicemen in a spirit of respect for the legal precepts. The basic aim of this work consists in making discipline, a high sense of responsibility for the assigned job and intolerance of antisocial phenomena a profound inner need of each serviceman. Ultimately, precise military law and order based upon the accurate fulfillment of Soviet laws, the requirements of the military oath and regulations and the orders of commanders and chiefs accustoms the men to daily lawful conduct.

Correct disciplinary practices by the commanders and chiefs are of primary significance for developing a high awareness of the law among the servicemen. The use of commendations for conscientious fulfillment of the duties established by the laws and military regulations, for excellence and industry in service and for reasonable initiative has the most beneficial indoctrinational impact on all the personnel.

The development of the habits and skills of correct conduct is also achieved by the prompt and correct responding to all infractions of military discipline, law and order. This includes both measures of persuasion as well as the imposing of disciplinary reprimands and is aimed at establishing the need for correct conduct in the conscience of each man. Particularly inadmissible in army life are instances of impunity and the covering up of any violations of military discipline, law and order. This has a negative effect upon the indoctrination in the servicemen of high responsibility and a conscious attitude toward the observance of the USSR Constitution and the requirements of the Soviet laws, military regulations and orders. Correct disciplinary practices ensure the achieving of the highest social useful result in the activities of the personnel and they contribute to the strengthening of law and order in the units and subunits.

A special word must be said about the legal indoctrination role of the legal service subunits. They are entrusted with a broad range of duties to ensure legality in the troop units, institutions, military schools, the enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Defense. Among these duties, of major significance are the following: ensuring legality in preparing orders, directives and other enforceable enactments; legal support for contractual and complaint work; the preparation of consultation and references on legal questions arising in the activities of military administrative bodies and military officials; participation in the elaboration and implementation of measures to strengthen legality and military, labor, financial and contractual discipline. In implementing such powers, the legal service officers help to further improve legal work and strengthen socialist legality in the troops. The legal supervision provided by them has an active influence on raising the legal preparedness of the officials.

The activities of the judge advocate and military tribunals are of great significance for developing high legal awareness among the servicemen. The legal protective practices of these law bodies convinces the men that the Soviet laws correctly defend the interests of the socialist state of all the people, the rights, liberties,

dignity and inviolability of the individual. The military lawyers also carry out extensive work to explain Soviet legislation and they participate in various forms of legal propaganda. This instills in the men a responsible attitude toward the law and persuades them of the need to strictly observe the requirements of the laws.

The involvement of the military lawyers and many other officials in the preparation of draft orders, directives and other enforceable documents is good legal schooling for them. In working out a legal document, an officer (this is particularly true of the staff and headquarters representatives) must know all the current prescripts on the given question. Their study is an indispensable condition for ensuring legality, as is demanded by the USSR Constitution.

The so-called exceptionally important powers hold a special place in the officer's work of applying the law. The Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces have given the commanders (chiefs) rights which are applied to prevent violations of military discipline and social order in special instances which do not tolerate any delay. For example, when there has been outright disobedience or resistance from a subordinate, a superior has the right and is indeed obliged to take all coercive measures to restore order up to the point of arresting the guilty party and instituting court proceedings against him. In the event that a serviceman commits a military crime for which the current legislation envisages the possibility of applying disciplinary measures, the commander (chief) has the right, considering the specific circumstances and consequences of this crime, to determine the question of whether the materials on the guilty party are to be turned over to the military prosecutor or a disciplinary reprimand suffices. The right to such a decision with the determining of the actual disciplinary measure belong solely to those commanders upon whom the turning over of materials to the military prosecutor directly depends under the law.

An exceptional right of the commander of a unit or formation and the chief of a military facility is his right, as an interrogation body, to initiate criminal cases. In the course of conducting an interrogation, the unit commander is granted extensive rights of a procedural nature and these have been granted him by the Instructions to the Interrogation Bodies of the Soviet Army and Navy. The presence of these and other rights of exceptional importance is determined by a number of particular features inherent to military service and above all by the consistent carrying out of the principle of one-man command in military life.

As we see, Soviet military legislation creates a firm legal basis for the commanders and superiors to apply the law. At the same time, by normative action it ensures the achieving of the ultimate goals confronting the Armed Forces. The rules of conduct for the servicemen as set down in the laws, troop regulations, manuals and other military legal enactments in the most active manner regulate the entire process of military service. They indicate what an officer should do in one or another situation and how he can or should proceed in carrying out his service functions. For this reason a knowledge of the legal standards and the possession of the required level of legal competence are an unbreakable demand addressed to each commander, chief and officer.

In the stage of a developed socialist society, the CPSU views legal training as one of the dependable means for raising an awareness of socialist law among the citizens. The high legal level of the Soviet officers achieved on this basis is the guarantee for their successful application of the law in the interests of further strengthening military discipline and maintaining constant combat readiness.

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ARMED FORCES

TROOP INDOCTRINATION ON USE OF WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT

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[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Docent, Col-Engr I. Ivanov: "To Know and Skillfully Employ the Assigned Military Equipment and Weapons"]

[Text] In the course of studying the given subject, it is essential to explain fully to the soldiers and sailors what great and truly Leninist concern our party and government show for equipping the Soviet Army and Navy with everything needed to securely defend the motherland and the victories of socialism. It is important that the students realize fully that the modern weapons and military equipment with which our Army and Navy are armed are the material basis of their might and a factor restraining the aggressive drives of the imperialists and their supporters on the world scene. This is why each man must thoroughly master the weapons and equipment and always be ready to use their greatest capabilities for repelling the aggressor.

Six hours are assigned for studying the subject. This time should be allocated as follows: 2 hours for a lecture (narration), 2 for independent studies and 2 for a seminar (discussion).

In the lecture (narration), it is desirable to take up three basic study questions: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the role of equipment in armed struggle and in achieving victory over the enemy. 2. The concern of the Communist Party and Soviet state for the technical equipping of our Armed Forces at the present stage. 3. To master the weapons and military equipment and to be an expert of military affairs.

In the short introduction it is essential to emphasize that the USSR, shoulder to shoulder with the other socialist nations, is actively and consistently carrying out a policy of peace. This derives from the very nature of our system. We do not have social strata which would gain from a war or military preparations and for which a militaristic policy would be beneficial. The aggressive imperialist circles headed by the United States act completely differently. They have initiated an unprecedented arms race. Over the next 5 years along, the United States plans to spend 1.5 trillion dollars for this, as much as was spent here over the last 12 years. "We should strengthen our positions in the world with the aid of weapons," Casper Weinberger, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, stated cynically.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government cannot help but consider the increased aggressiveness of imperialism in their daily activities. "During the report period,"

commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the party and government not for a single day overlooked the questions of strengthening the defense might of the nation and its Armed Forces. The international situation obliges us to do this." ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 66). The weapons and military equipment which the motherland has given to its defenders serve the security of the nation, our allies and friends and the defense of the great cause of building communism. In carrying out the tasks stemming from the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the Soviet military are steadily mastering the difficult military equipment and the methods of using it and are in constant combat readiness.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Role of Equipment in Armed Combat and in Achieving Victory over the Enemy

The founders of scientific communism, K. Marx and F. Engels, were the first to give a truly scientific explanation of the role and place of military equipment in armed combat and they brought out the most important patterns of its development. They profoundly analyzed the history of military affairs, the origin and development of the armed forces, their class nature and the history of weapons development. They established the close relationship between military equipment, the forms of organizing the armed forces and the methods of conducting armed combat, having emphasized the crucial role of weapons. "...The advances of technology," wrote F. Engels, "as soon as they become usable and are actually employed in military affairs, immediately...cause changes and even revolutions in the method of conducting combat..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 20, p 176). In this regard the founders of Marxism pointed to the enormous impact of science on the development and technical equipping of the army and they emphasized the importance of the soldiers' mastery of the new equipment and weapons. F. Engels pointed out, for example, that no conscientious soldier should be ignorant of how his weapon has been designed and how it should be used.

V. I. Lenin carefully studied the military theoretical heritage of K. Marx and F. Engels and developed it under the new historical conditions and in relation to the tasks confronting the proletariat which had been victorious in a revolution. The leader of the workers provided a profound Marxist elucidation of the role of military equipment in armed combat. He repeatedly emphasized the important significance of military equipment and weapons as the material basis of the Red Army's combat capability. More advanced equipment, in his opinion, was one of the main sources of superiority in military affairs, for in a war "the upper hand is gained by the one with the greatest equipment, organization, discipline and better machines..." (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 116). The constant improvement of military equipment, in the mind of V. I. Lenin, comprises the basis for the development of the armed forces and for the rise of the new branches of troops. The new means of armed combat in turn cause fundamental changes in the methods of conducting combat operations.

In pointing to the exceptionally important significance of modern weapons, V. I. Lenin at the same time stressed that the strength of the new weapons lies in the men who have mastered these weapons and are capable of employing them most effectively in combat. One of the basic reasons for the defeat of the Tsarist Army in the Russo-Japanese War was seen by Lenin in the fact that the personnel had poorly mastered the weapons and had little technical knowledge.

During the severe period of the Civil War, the party's leader demanded that the communists and all the workers master military affairs and study the military equipment. "In particular the communists should industriously study machine guns, artillery, armor and so forth, for here our lag is more tangible and here the enemy's superiority with a large number of officers is significant...here the role of the communist to the greatest degree is important" (PSS, Vol 39, p 58).

In noting the enormous significance of new weapons for achieving victory over the enemies of the socialist fatherland, V. I. Lenin pointed out the ways for the technical equipping of the Red Army. The main one was the greatest possible development of the national economy and the creation of a defense industry. The great leader convincingly showed that in today's world, the dependence of a state's military might upon the economic and sociopolitical conditions has increased even more. For the organizing of a powerful revolutionary army, it was essential to have a new economic base and a new, higher method of production. In any war, the determining role in achieving victory is played by the social system and its economic capabilities. The economic capabilities of waging a war in defense of worker revolutionary victories, V. I. Lenin taught, grow greatly precisely with the victory of the socialist revolution and the victory of socialism: "...The defense capability of a nation which has overthrown the yoke of capital, which has given the peasants land and has put the banks and factories under worker control would be much greater than the defense capability of a capitalist nation" (PSS, Vol 34, p 331).

As is known, heavy industry is the material and technical basis of the national economy and its defense capability. For this reason the leader of our party and state gave special importance to its development. He pointed out that the rebuilding and development of the young Soviet republic's productive forces should be carried out on the basis of large-scale industry and the electrification of the nation.

In strengthening the nation's defense capability, V. I. Lenin assigned a major role to science and to introducing the most recent achievements of scientific and technical progress into practice. In the Accountability Report of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress, having pointed to the need for developing Soviet science, V. I. Lenin confronted the working class with the task of combining revolutionary enthusiasm with the ongoing study of modern technology. He voiced the conviction that "no dark force can resist the alliance of the representatives of science, the proletariat and technology" (PSS, Vol 40, p 189). New inventions in the area of science and technology, in Lenin's opinion, make our nation's defense so strong that any attack on it would be impossible.

Lenin was constantly concerned with ensuring proper working and living conditions for the scientists, engineers and inventors. He supported in every possible way the activities of K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, F. A. Tsander and many other scientists whose efforts helped to strengthen the young Soviet republic, including in the defense area. V. I. Lenin constantly recommended a thorough and close study of the most recent military-technical achievements abroad and the mastery of all types of weapons and all the means and methods of combat which an enemy could have.

The Communist Party in all its activities in the area of strengthening the nation's defense capability and improving the Soviet Armed Forces has always been led and is led by Lenin's instructions. After the end of the Civil War, the party constantly considered the possibility of a new attack on our nation and was aware that a new

war, if international imperialism forced it on us, would be no less uncompromising and would require the subordination of all the forces and resources to a single goal of defeating the enemy. Such a war would necessitate extended efforts by the entire national economy. The party prepared the nation and the army ahead of time to repel the aggressors.

The equipping of the Red Army with new equipment and weapons became possible in the prewar years due to the outstanding achievements of the Soviet people in carrying out Lenin's plan for building socialism and in creating a powerful industrial basis which would ensure the reconstruction of the entire national economy on an advanced technical basis. The CPSU Program states that the industrialization of the USSR has been a great feat of the working class and all the people who have spared neither energy or resources and who consciously accepted the hardships in order to raise the nation up out of backwardness.

From the moment of its inception, Soviet military thought has been based upon a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the development of the methods and means of armed combat and has been developed by prominent Soviet military figures and leaders from the Leninist school under the party's leadership. Thus, the outstanding Soviet military leader M. Frunze wrote that in the event of the outbreak of new wars "the center of gravity will shift to the corresponding organization of industry and generally the entire national economy." He concluded that "our attitude toward discoveries in the area of chemistry and mechanics must be as if they were crucial turning points in the general course of military operations...."

In determining the structure of the new type army, Soviet military thought proceeded from the necessity of the proportional development of the Armed Services and branches of troops, their maximum motorization and equipping with the most modern weapons. In speaking about the importance of equipping the Red Army with new weapons, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskiy pointed out: "Our task now is in the shortest time to create powerful, long-range aviation, powerful mobile armored and tank forces, to modernize the artillery, to equip the infantry with automatic weapons and modern transport and to provide the troops with new communications and control equipment and new bridge-crossing equipment."

As is known, it was not possible to fully carry out the plans for reequipping the Red Army in the prewar period. History left us too little time for this. Moreover, the Nazi command used the surprise factor. A colossal military machine based on the economy of the entire Nazi-conquered Western Europe was thrown against our nation. But the advantages of socialism, the enormous scope of organizational activities carried out by the Communist Party, the possibility of concentrating all the economic resources on the needs of the front, the great patriotism and self-sacrifice of the rear workers--all of this made it possible for us in a brief period of time to organize the output of military equipment in quantities significantly exceeding enemy weapons production. From the start of the war up to September 1945, we manufactured 134,100 aircraft, 102,800 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 825,200 guns and mortars. During the war years the USSR produced 2-fold more weapons and military equipment and with higher tactical and technical performance than did Nazi Germany.

As a whole, the high technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces achieved due to the enormous concern and constant organizational activities of the Communist Party was one of the crucial factors of our world historical victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In briefly summing up what has been said on the first question, it is essential to emphasize that the party's policy in the national defense area is based upon Lenin's teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland. This is embodied in the decisions of the party congresses, the Central Committee plenums, in other party documents, the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on defense questions and the demands of the USSR minister of defense. The legacy of V. I. Lenin on equipping the new type of army which defends the revolutionary victories with the most modern equipment and weapons and on the need of studying military affairs effectively plays an enormous role in strengthening our nation's defense capability and in increasing the combat readiness of its valorous Armed Forces.

2. The Concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet State for the Technical Equipping of Our Armed Forces at the Present Stage

In all stages of its development, the Soviet Union has been decisively against the arms race unleashed by the capitalist nations and has done everything within its power to check it. However, the reactionary circles of imperialism each time have rejected the peace initiatives of the USSR and have accelerated the pace of increasing their military-technical might.

Soon after the end of World War II, the United States set out to rapidly develop nuclear weapons and their carriers, strategic aircraft and missiles. Naturally, under such conditions the Communist Party and the Soviet government, loyal to the legacy of V. I. Lenin to defend the defense capability of our nation and our Red Army like the apple of our eye, had to be effectively concerned with maintaining the level of combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces on the proper level and with making certain that the Soviet military always had the most modern weapons.

In order to oppose the blackmail and dictatorship of the American imperialists who during the first postwar years possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, the USSR was forced to create its own nuclear missile weapons. In relying on the achievements of the socialist economy, science and technology, our nation quickly carried out this exceptionally important task. By 1949, the USSR had created an atomic bomb and in 1953, a hydrogen one. By the end of the 1950's, our Army and Navy were receiving nuclear ammunition and various range missiles.

The postwar years have been years of rapid scientific and technical progress. In contributing to the rapid development of the productive forces, to increasing production efficiency and to the flourishing of the national economy, scientific and technical progress at the same time has served and is serving as one of the most important factors in strengthening defense might. "...The economy, science and technology in our nation are presently on such a high level," pointed out the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "that we are capable in the shortest period of time of developing any type of weapon on which the enemies of peace would care to wager."

The party and the Soviet people, in the aims of the technical reequipping of the Army and Navy, have widely used the achievements of Soviet nuclear physics, radio-electronics, radiophysics, computer technology, progress in the area of gas dynamics and aerodynamics in developing new types of fuel and structural materials. The modern types of weapons developed in our nation on a basis of the modern scientific and technical achievements possess great range, high speed, significant strike and destructive power and aiming accuracy.

The introduction of qualitatively new, more powerful types of weapons in the troops and their constant improvement have naturally led to changes in the organizational structure of the troops, in their combat configuration, in the momentum of advance, the forms of maneuver, the nature of defense and other types of combat activity. For example, the development of nuclear missile weapons has led to the formation of a new independent service of the Soviet Armed Forces, the strategic rocket troops. They are the main component part of the strategic nuclear forces which have become a powerful factor in restraining the aggressor.

At the same time, the party proceeds from the view that national security and in the event that the imperialists unleash a war, a victory in it are ensured by the constant, harmonious development of all the services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops in accord with the last word of science and technology. For this reason the party has shown constant concern for continuously improving both the Strategic Rocket Troops as well as the Ground Troops, Air Defense Troops, Air Forces and Navy.

The Ground Troops have been provided with significant weapons and equipment. This has made it possible for them to make powerful strikes against the enemy while on the move. The increased number of tanks and infantry combat vehicles in the attack echelon has increased the dynamicness and speed of operations.

The motorized rifle units and formations can engage in combat on the move, without the dismounting of the subunits, they can conduct combat in cooperation with the tanks, they can maneuver quickly on the battlefield, increase the forces where the greatest success will be achieved, cross water obstacles without a halt and develop the offensive rapidly on radioactive terrain.

Recently the fire power of the rocket troops and artillery of the Ground Troops has increased greatly. The rocket troops of the Ground Troops are equipped with nuclear ammunition and their mobility and efficient use have been increased. This makes it possible for them to carry out tasks of destroying and neutralizing targets to the entire depth of combat operations.

Particular mention should be made of our modern tanks. These are powerful combat vehicles the development of which embodies tank construction experience acquired in the war years as well as the recent scientific and technical achievements. Our tanks are equipped with modern observation and firing devices and they securely protect the crews against the effect of weapons of mass destruction. This makes it possible for the tank troops to successfully carry out various combat missions both during the day and at night using both conventional weapons as well as under conditions of using nuclear missile weapons. The tank units and formations can fight both in cooperation with the other branches of troops and Armed Services as well as independently. Here they are capable of rapidly crossing areas of man-made obstacles and destruction and major water barriers.

The Air Defense Troops have also risen to a new quality level. They are rightly called constantly combat-ready troops. In peacetime they have been entrusted with carrying out an important state task of standing alert duty. The USSR air frontier is under unflagging observation. Day and night, in any weather, from the freezing ice of the Arctic to the burning sands of the Karakums, from the Pacific to the Baltic, the missile troops, pilots, radar operators, communications troops and men of other specialties vigilantly stand alert duty.

In the Air Defense Troops the antiaircraft missile troops possess great fire power. They are armed with advanced missile complexes with increased range, a high kill accuracy and resistance to jamming and they provide the dependable hitting of any air attack weapon across the entire range of altitudes and speeds and at a great distance away from the defended installations.

The aviation of the Air Defense Troops possesses modern supersonic missile-carrying interceptor fighters. They are capable of destroying the air enemy at the distant approaches to the defended installations having powerful missile and cannon weapons for this.

The radar troops under the Air Defense Troops are equipped with modern technology for conducting radar reconnaissance of air targets and for providing dependable information to the antiaircraft missile troops and aviation. Automated control systems are very widely used in the modern Air Defense Troops. This makes it possible for the commanders in controlling fire in a short period of time to take the most rational decisions and to effectively utilize the capabilities of the military equipment, including against targets flying at maximum-low altitudes.

Our Air Forces are a mighty Armed Service. The air formations and units are equipped with supersonic missile-carrying aircraft and bombers with a great payload and range. Our fighters which are armed with air-to-air missiles are capable of destroying manned and unmanned enemy air weapons over the entire range of altitudes and speeds. The missile-carrying aircraft armed with high powered and high precision guided weapons and equipped with all-weather navigation and aiming systems can hit any ground targets, including small and mobile ones with nuclear and conventional ammunition without entering the air defense zone. Multipurpose variable wing configuration aircraft have been developed as well as vertical take-off and landing aircraft. The military transports are capable of long-distance air-ferrying and the landing of troops and military equipment, including tanks. Soviet helicopter construction has also achieved great success.

Scientific and technical progress has made it possible to raise the combat might of the Soviet Navy to a new level. Our powerful ocean-going fleet is an aggregate of carefully balanced branches of forces, including: submarines, surface vessels, naval aviation, shore missile and artillery troops and the naval infantry. Its might is based upon nuclear-powered and missile-armed submarines; aviation capable of conducting combat operations from airfields and aircraft carriers; surface vessels including the ASW cruisers "Kiev," "Minsk," "Moskva" and "Leningrad," and missile cruisers one of which has been given the proud name of "Varyag." The missile and ASW aircraft-carrying ships embody the most recent achievements of Soviet power engineering, rocket building, aviation technology and radioelectronics. The Soviet Navy serves as a reliable means for restraining the imperialist aggressors.

This now is the level of technical equipping in the Soviet Armed Forces developed due to the concern of the party and state as well as by the stubborn labor of the Soviet people. This level allows the Army and Navy to successfully carry out the tasks confronting them in ensuring the dependable security of the USSR. The Communist Party, its Central Committee and the Soviet government have been forced to allocate to improving weapons and military equipment enough funds for ensuring the maintaining of high Army and Navy combat readiness and for guaranteeing the security of the socialist fatherland and our allies. They are forced to do this since the USSR would never arm itself for the sake of weapons and has never been and will not be

a supporter of the arms race. Its concern for strengthening defense capability is determined by the threat of war arising from imperialism and the Chinese hegemonists.

As is known for many years in the world there has been an approximate military-strategic equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This equilibrium is of fundamental historical significance. It objectively helps to maintain peace in the world and meets the fundamental interests of all peoples. But in recent years the imperialists led by the NATO bloc and primarily the United States, without considering the interests of the peoples, have begun to upset this equilibrium in their own favor and to the detriment of the USSR and the other socialist countries.

As was already pointed out, military allocations of the NATO nations are growing at an unprecedented rate. In the United States, an enormous portion of these funds is going into the development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons. The development of the new generation of ICBM and strategic cruise missiles, the development of laser weapons which can be carried on spacecraft, the decision of the U.S. government to begin a new program for increasing the strategic nuclear arsenals, the full-scale production of the barbarian neutron weapons and the introduction of other means of mass destruction--all of this shows the attempts by imperialism to achieve military superiority.

Of great danger to universal peace were the decisions adopted at the December (1979) Session of the NATO Council to deploy a new generation of medium-range American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. According to this plan, 108 Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and 464 Tomahawk ground-based cruise missiles would be deployed on the territory of the FRG, England, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The deployment of new medium-range missiles in positions in Western Europe would fundamentally alter the strategic situation not only in Europe but throughout the world. The Pershing-2 missiles, as is known, have a range of 2,500 km and can hit targets in the Soviet Union at which they are aimed within 5-6 minutes after launching. The flight time to the target is greater for the cruise missiles but they can fly at low altitudes. In the opinion of Western military specialists, this impedes their detection by modern radars.

The main plan of the Washington political and military leaders is to attempt to reduce the strength of the retaliatory strike against U.S. territory in the event of aggression against the USSR. In their opinion, it is completely possible to start a so-called "limited nuclear war" in the course of which the medium-range weapons located in Western Europe could be employed against vitally important Soviet targets. Then, supposedly, the Soviet response would be restricted to the European continent and the United States would remain invulnerable. The illusory nature of such plans scarcely need be proven.

In speaking in September 1981 at a dinner honoring the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Comrade Le Duan, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "As for the USSR we have never sought and do not seek military superiority. We are not moving and do not intend to move beyond a concern for securely protecting the security of our nation and the security of our allies. The USSR has constantly urged the abandoning of the development of new, even more powerful, types of weapons. But I can say with all responsibility that we would not be indifferent to the appearance

of such weapons in the arsenals of the United States and other NATO members. If this happens, the Soviet Armed Forces will possess a dependable counterweight to such weapons."

The 11th Five-Year Plan must become an important stage in strengthening USSR economic and defense might. The 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that the economic policy which the party is proposing for the 11th Five-Year Plan and the 1980's reflects the fundamental vital interests of the Soviet people. It ensures the ongoing advancement of our society along the path of increased worker prosperity and the creation of the material and technical base of communism. The successful carrying out of the 11th Five-Year Plan will ensure a further rise in the nation's economic potential, increased prosperity of the people and at the same time the maintaining of the Soviet state's defense might on the proper level while its authority will rise even higher.

3. To Master the Weapons and Military Equipment and Be an Expert of Military Affairs

The Accountability Report of the Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress pointed out: "A close unity of high technical equipping, military skill and unshakable morale--this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 66). Combat potential is directly dependent upon the training level of the Army and Navy personnel and upon the level of their military skill. Quite understandably man has been and remains the main, crucial force in a war. Victory in battles and engagements is achieved by those armies the personnel of which serve high ideals, possess unbending combat morale and high military skill and are able to best employ the modern weapons and equipment assigned to them in combating the enemy. The high combat skill of the Soviet military was one of the most important sources of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. Millions of patriots were tempered and became true experts of military affairs in the flames of the battles for the motherland. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev described this well in his memoirs "Malaya Zemlya": "to the zeal, desperate bravery and patriotism of the men were added cool-headedness, maturity, calculation, the ability to fight and all of this, taken together, brought us victory." Combat experience now has not lost its importance. At the same time the scientific and technical revolution and the truly revolutionary changes caused by it in military affairs have given rise to much that is new in the training, instruction and indoctrination of the troops.

The equipping of the Army and Navy with new types of weapons and combat equipment has led to a rapid rise in the number of military-technical specialties. While in World War II there were around 160 of them, at present there are about 2,000. Here the specialties themselves have become noticeably more complex while the demands made upon the skills of the men operating the equipment have increased greatly.

The good general educational level of the young men being inducted into the army helps them in successfully mastering military affairs. At present virtually 100 percent of the Soviet military has at least an eighth-grade education and the number of servicemen with a higher and secondary education is around 80 percent. Naturally such educated people more quickly and better master the difficult equipment, the regulation weapons of the subunits and related specialties. This helps in successfully carrying out the combat training tasks. In the Army and Navy there are many servicemen who have mastered several specialties. This shows the high overall training of the men, the increased amount of their knowledge, ability and skills as well as their personal responsibility for carrying out military duty.

In each collective there are able, excellently trained soldiers and sailors, experts in firing and the driving of combat vehicles and other specialists. It is a good thing if the propagandist briefly describes the best of them and how step-by-step they achieved military expertise.

It is particularly important for each soldier to learn how to fire accurately from his weapon. Certainly it is no secret that in combat the enemy is hit with fire. The attack is prepared for and the offensive is supported by fire and the enemy personnel, weapons and equipment are hit by fire. Modern combat which employs the most modern weapons is particularly dynamic and fast. Considering this it is essential to be able to hit the target with the first round, the first burst, the first missile launch or the first attack in air and sea combat. Hence the soldier must have an excellent knowledge of the rules and procedures for firing his weapon and develop confident skills in handling them so that even in a difficult situation he is not confused, he can fire accurately and destructively and best the enemy. A thorough knowledge of one's weapons instills in the soldier confidence and firm conviction that in a difficult moment it will not fail and will ensure victory over the enemy. Of course, it must not be forgotten that accurate shots bring victory only when they are combined with high field skills of the soldier and the ability to act effectively on any terrain or at any time of year and day.

The dependable path to military skill lies through a constant struggle to improve the quality of each exercise and above all the firing and tank firing training. These help to improve individual skills of the gunners and operators as well as achieve firing teamwork among the subunits. The success of any exercise, training drill, field or range exercise depends largely upon the effort made by the soldiers and to fully utilize the precious minutes of training time to improve their skills. And one should not have to be specially reminded of this. It is better from the very outset of service to follow the good rule that each day one rises to a new level of skill. There should not be a single hour of combat training which did not bring at least the slightest but real success in improving military skills and in the developing of the soldier or sailor as an able and dependable defender of the motherland.

The socialist competition has become an effective means for increasing the activity of the men in combat training and in studying the equipment and weapons. This is an indispensable part of the training process and has brought to life many valuable patriotic initiatives such as: "Hit the Target with the First Round, the First Burst, the First Launch and the First Run at the Target," "Fire at Night Using Day-time Standards," "Master All the Regulation Weapons of the Subunit," "There Should be No Laggards Next to an Outstanding Man" and so forth. It is the duty and honorable obligation of each soldier and sailor to struggle constantly to carry out the adopted socialist obligation, to try in a short time to become an outstanding man in training and a class specialist, to master related specialties and ultimately to become a true expert of military affairs.

Modern weapons, as a rule, are collective weapons. This gives rise to the high responsibility of each member in a collective for the level of his own skill and a desire to constantly improve it so that in a crucial moment the squad, team, crew or battle station would not be let down.... Certainly the success of carrying out the given mission will depend largely upon the precise teamwork of the men, their mutual understanding and readiness at any moment to help each other. For this reason, each soldier or sailor must make his contribution to creating a healthy

microclimate in the collective, he must strengthen friendship and comradeship in it, provide mutual aid in combat training and show unfailing efficiency.

It goes without saying that modern weapons and military equipment can be skillfully used only under the condition of the strictest military discipline. The seemingly most insignificant deviation from the combat employment or maintenance rules of complex modern equipment, even by one man, can jeopardize the carrying out of the set mission by the entire collective. At present, particular attention is given to discipline in military service, discipline on alert duty and so forth.

It is also essential to always remember that the equipment and weapons assigned to the men for defending the motherland are extremely valuable. For this reason it is very important that each serviceman skillfully service the equipment, strictly observe the rules and conditions for its operation as outlined by the appropriate instructions and regulations and maintain it in constant combat readiness.

The high skills of the Army and Navy specialists and the rich experience of operating the equipment under the most diverse conditions make it possible for them to find new, more effective methods for servicing and the combat employment of weapons and equipment. A creative attitude towards one's duties gives rise to valuable proposals aimed at reducing the time required to bring the equipment to a state of combat readiness, at increasing its reliability, improving operational specifications, more careful safekeeping and improved quality of labor by specialists in the course of repairs and fleet servicing days. Many units and subunits have innovators and rationalizers among the servicemen. It would be wise if the propagandist would describe some of them in the exercise and urge the men to participate in rationalization activities.

In mastering military skills, one must not forget for even a second the safety rules in operating and servicing the military equipment and weapons. Any "liberties" in handling modern equipment can be a serious near-miss or even serve as the cause of the loss of men. This must constantly be remembered.

The last training year showed that a predominant majority of the Soviet military has confidently mastered the powerful equipment and weapons assigned to them and is capable of successfully carrying out the most involved tasks. This was demonstrated with particular clarity at the "Zapad-81" [West-81] Exercises which were conducted from 4 through 12 September 1981 on the territory of the Belorussian and Baltic military districts and in the Baltic Sea. The formations and units involved in these exercises from the various Armed Services and branches of troops were equipped with modern weapons and first-rate military equipment. The missile and motorized rifle troops, the tank troops and artillerymen, the landing troops and naval infantry, the combat engineers and signalmen, the aviators and sailors worked in a dynamic and complex situation as close as possible to the conditions of combat reality. Here they demonstrated a good knowledge of the equipment and weapons and the ability to effectively and confidently employ them in combat.

Here is a characteristic example. In endeavoring to break through our defenses, the "enemy" landed a tactical airborne party in the rear of one of the divisions. Seconds determined whether the paratroopers after landing would succeed in deploying and attacking the first-echelon subunits from the division or whether their actions would be checked by the men in the company of Guards Sr Lt M. Vagin who was

ordered to seal off and destroy the airborne force. The motorized rifle troops honorably carried out the task given to them and in a brief engagement "destroyed" the landed "enemy." This, of course, was no accident. The company personnel had prepared excellently for actions in the most difficult situation and had mastered the assigned military equipment and weapons. This mastery arose in the process of intense military training, from repeated working through of the combat training standards and in the close mutual aid of the guardsmen. The subordinates of Officer M. Vagin were accustomed to operate in a difficult situation, without weaknesses and oversimplification and at full force. For this reason their success in the "Zapad-81" Exercises was quite natural.

In completing the material on the subject, it is wise to emphasize that the Soviet military, in being surrounded by the love of all the people, vigilantly guard the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people and the great socialist victories. They are learning to master the first-rate military equipment and weapons assigned to them, they are successfully carrying out the tasks confronting them and are always ready to decisively rebuff any aggressor.

In preparing for the exercise on the given subject, it is essential to recommend that the students read the work of V. I. Lenin "The Fall of Port Arthur" (PSS, Vol 9, pp 155-156); the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 20-23, 66); the speech by the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov in the field inspection of the troops participating in the "Zapad-81" Exercises (PRAVDA, 13 September 1981) and the textbook for political exercises "Na strazhe Rodiny" [On Guard for the Motherland], (Voenizdat, 1978, pp 161-166).

During the evening it is possible to show the men the films "The Choice of the Target," "A Particularly Important Mission" and "Baptism by Fire" and the documentary films "Always Be On Guard" and "I Serve the Soviet Union."

In the seminar (discussion) it is advisable to discuss the following questions: 1. V. I. Lenin on the necessity of studying military affairs and to be constantly ready to defend the motherland. 2. How is the party's concern for maintaining the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy on the proper level manifested? 3. How did the 26th CPSU Congress describe the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces? What are its components? 4. Why are the demands increasing on the military skill of a soldier (sailor) under today's conditions? 5. What tasks confront the personnel of a subunit or unit (ship) in the area of studying military equipment and weapons?

Literature for Propagandists

1. V. I. Lenin, "Concluding Speech on the Treaty for Ratifying the Peace Treaty of 15 March," PSS, Vol 36, p 116.
2. V. I. Lenin, "The Fall of Port Arthur," PSS, Vol 9, pp 155-156.
3. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [The USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Articles 31, 32, 62, 63.

4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 20-23, 66.
5. L. I. Brezhnev, "Replies to Questions Posed by the Editors of the West German Journal DER SPIEGEL," PRAVDA, 3 November 1981.
6. D. F. Ustinov, "Speech at a Reception in the Kremlin in Honor of the Military Academy Graduates," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 July 1981.
7. D. F. Ustinov, "Speech at the Field Inspection of the Troops Participating in the 'Zapad-81' Exercises," PRAVDA, 13 September 1981.

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ARMED FORCES

SERVICEMEN'S BENEFITS IN HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 81 (signed to press 5 Nov 81) pp 80-83

[Article by Col Just (Res) M. Orlov: "The New Regulation on Benefits to Servicemen and Their Families"]

[Text] The reader G. Luk'yanov has asked what has caused the adoption of the new Regulation Governing Benefits for Servicemen and has asked for more detailed information on the benefits in the area of health care and education.

We are responding to his request.

The Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 17 February 1981 ratified a new Regulation Governing Benefits to Servicemen, Reservists, Persons Retired from Military Service and Their Families. The elaboration of the given USSR government decree was a component part of a broad plan of work to bring Soviet legislation into conformity with the USSR Constitution and to prepare and publish a compendium of Soviet laws. This decree is to be incorporated in the fourth Section of the Compendium of USSR Laws devoted to legislation on national defense and the guarding of the state frontiers.

More than 50 years have passed since the adoption of the previous Code Governing Benefits for Servicemen and Reservists of the Worker-Peasant Red Army and Their Families as approved by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars of 23 April 1930. As a result of the profound political and socioeconomic changes which have occurred in our nation over the past period, many provisions established by the Code have lost their practical significance and were recognized as invalid. At the same time certain current standards contained obsolete provisions and terminology which did not conform to the USSR Constitution and the other legislative enactments. Moreover, after the introduction of the Code on the questions of benefits for servicemen and their families a significant number of other legislative and governmental enactments had been issued and this impeded the application of legislation in this area. The standards which have continued to be valid have been incorporated in the new Benefits Regulation.

The new enactment governing benefits for servicemen, reservists, persons retired from military service and their families, along with general provisions, gives in detail the benefits granted to the designated persons for taxes and fees, housing

benefits, in the area of health care and education, for travel, postal benefits, monetary assistance and benefits in the area of labor and social security.

Of essential significance for ensuring the strict execution of the Regulation is the provision which establishes that in all instances when the rights or legitimate interests of persons having the right to benefits have been violated, the state bodies and officials take the necessary measures to restore the violated rights and to defend the legitimate interests of these persons both upon their own initiative and upon the request of the interested citizens and organizations.

The present consultation examines the benefits established by the Regulation in the area of health care and education.

Benefits in the Area of Health Care

The standards relating to benefits in the health care area are based on the appropriate provisions of the USSR Constitution (Article 42) which provide the right of the USSR citizens to health care, free skilled medical aid and so forth. At the same time the Regulation also provides particular features in ensuring medical assistance to servicemen and reservists.

Servicemen and reservists called up for training are covered by all types of medical aid, including the dispensing of medicines in the military medical facilities. If the appropriate military medical facilities, departments or special equipment are lacking in the given area, the designated persons are provided with all types of medical aid, including the dispensing of medicines, in civilian public health institutions under the USSR Ministry of Public Health, the Union and autonomous ministries of public health, other ministries and departments or the executive committees of the local soviets, on the same bases with other citizens.

The members of serviceman families (with the exception of the families of servicemen in regular service), with the impossibility of obtaining medical aid in the civilian medical institutions, are provided with all types of medical assistance in the corresponding military medical facilities on equal bases with the servicemen.

The regulation also contains standards relating to sanatorium and resort treatment. In particular, it is provided that warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], officer personnel and their families are provided with sanatorium and resort treatment in the sanatoriums (the sanatorium departments of military hospitals) and vacation homes of the Ministry of Defense. Sanatorium and resort treatment for family members of the designated servicemen is provided if there are available beds assigned to this group.

The procedure for medical selection and the sending of patients to sanatorium and resort treatment is established by the Ministry of Defense.

In instances when the servicemen (with the exception of servicemen in regular service) are not provided with sanatorium and resort treatment in the sanatoriums and vacation homes of the Ministry of Defense, they have the right to such treatment at their own expense in civilian sanatorium and resort facilities with reduced travel costs.

Persons from the senior and higher officer personnel discharged into the reserves or retired because of age or illness, if they have served 25 years and more, keep the right to their coverage for medical aid as well as for the members of their family, while those requiring this also have the right to treatment in the polyclinics, sanatoriums and vacation homes of the Ministry of Defense.

This right is also granted to officers discharged into the reserves because of impaired health or personnel cutbacks with the rank of colonel and its equal upon serving 25 years and more if they have reached the age of 45 by the day of discharge; this is also extended to the members of their families.

Serviceman pensioners and members of their families are granted all types of medical and prosthetic aid in civilian public health institutions and social security institutions within the procedures and under equal conditions for pensioners who are civilian employees and the members of their families.

Benefits in the Education Area

The Regulation grants extensive benefits and advantages to servicemen in preparing for and in admission to institutions of learning.

Persons who have been called up for active military service during a period of instruction in institutions of learning, upon discharge into the reserves, keep the right to be enrolled for ongoing studies in the same institution of learning and in the same year where they were studying prior to induction. Here they are given a scholarship from the day of returning to the institution of learning up to the results of the next examination session.

Servicemen discharged from active military service are granted preference in admission to institutions of higher learning in accord with the current legislation.

Officer personnel discharged from military service because of health, age or personnel cutbacks are admitted to higher and specialized secondary schools without taking entrance examinations as follows:

For the first and second years of institutions of higher learning--those having an incomplete or complete higher education;

For the preparatory departments under institutions of higher learning with the payment of a scholarship--for those who have completed secondary general education schools;

For the first and subsequent years of specialized secondary schools--for those who have finished secondary military schools;

For the first year of specialized secondary schools--for those with at least an eighth-grade education.

The admission of the designated persons to schools is carried out in addition to the admission plan established for the given school during the entire academic year.

Students of the daytime higher and specialized secondary schools as well as the students in the preparatory departments under the institutions of higher learning, when being officers discharged from military service without the right to a pension, are paid a scholarship if they receive satisfactory grades.

Servicemen discharged from military service and having a complete secondary education are admitted to the preparatory departments under the institutions of higher learning upon recommendation of the command of the troop units as well as leaders of industrial enterprises, construction sites, transportation and communications organizations, sovkhozes and kolkhozes as well as by recommendation of the party, Komsomol and trade union organizations.

The employees of industrial enterprises, construction projects, sovkhozes and kolkhozes who have been discharged into the reserves after active regular military service, with the paying of a scholarship by these organizations, can be admitted for instruction to the higher and specialized secondary schools and to the preparatory departments under the institutions of higher learning, with the counting of the time of military service as part of the practical work.

Servicemen discharged from military service are also granted preference in admission to vocational-technical schools and for training courses in the corresponding professions. A scholarship is paid to them for the period of instruction in accord with the current legislation.

A number of provisions contained in the Regulation are devoted to the advantages and benefits granted to the children of servicemen in their admission to schools and children's preschool institutions.

The children of reenlisted servicemen, warrant officers and officer personnel discharged from military service have the right to unimpeded admission to primary, 8-year and general education secondary schools at their place of residence.

A benefit has been established for children of servicemen who have returned from abroad or from distant localities of the USSR in terms of the time for taking school exams if they have moved to the new residence during the fourth quarter of the academic year. In these instances they have the right to take passing and graduation exams in the general education schools during the period from 20 August through 1 September.

The executive committees of the local soviets, no later than 1 month from the day of application by wives the husbands of whom have been called up for active military service, place their children in creches, nurseries and nursery creches regardless of the departmental affiliation of these children's preschool institutions.

If the children of a serviceman on active military service have lost their mother or his minor brothers and sisters have lost their parents, in all instances they are placed first in children's homes, child homes, boarding schools and other corresponding institutions.

The USSR Council of Ministers has obliged the Union and autonomous republic councils of ministers, the executive committees of the soviets, the leaders of ministries, state committees and departments as well as the leaders of enterprises, institutions

and organizations to exercise constant and strict control over the unswerving observance of the designated Regulation by all officials. It is also essential to bear in mind that the servicemen, reservists, persons retired from military service and the members of their families who have the right to benefits under the designated Regulation, along with the listed benefits, also have the benefits provided for them by other legislative enactments.

In particular, according to the current Regulation, the servicemen who meet the established admission rules and who successfully pass the competitive entrance exams may be admitted to military schools. Here when their applications for study have been approved, the servicemen are not moved in service, with the exception of appointment to higher positions, they are not sent on long missions and if possible are not assigned to various types of details on days off and holidays.

Officers and warrant officers who have applied to military schools are released from command exercises and can use this time for independent preparation for exams. Moreover, during the week two free evenings on workdays are also provided to them for preparations. Applicants who have been admitted to the entrance exams are given regular leave in such a manner that it can be fully used during the first semester and no later than May-June.

For the more organized and effective preparation of the regular and reenlisted servicemen for the entrance exams, each year in May-June, 30-day training assemblies are conducted for them and in the necessary instances the corresponding training and consulting points are set up under the officer clubs.

Reenlisted servicemen, warrant officers and officers, with the permission of the appropriate commanders (chiefs) can study in civilian evening and correspondence schools. In these instances they are granted additional leave and other established benefits.

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ARMED FORCES

POLITICAL WORK: IMPLEMENTING PARTY MEETING DECISIONS

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[Unattributed article: "Action Follows the Decision; How the Fulfillment of Party Meeting Decisions is Organized"]

[Text] A party meeting has approved a decree.... Then commences an important stage in the party organization's life. The decision of the meeting which is the highest body of the party organization embodies the collective wisdom and the collective will of the communists, their desire and readiness to successfully carry out the tasks confronting the party organization and personnel of the unit or subunit. It is the direct duty of the party collective and primarily its leaders to immediately set to carrying out what has been planned.

A unity of word and deed, decisions and practical activity is an indispensable law in the life of the Communist Party. V. I. Lenin saw one of the main and requisite conditions for its strength and the guarantee for its successful activities in the fact that "after a decision by the competent bodies, all of us, the party members, act like a single person." Lenin considered practicality and professionalism and the ability to carry out organizational work to be important communist traits. He condemned successive infatuation with resolutions when not backed up by intense activity, demanding "practical, professional guarantees that the decision...would not remain merely on paper."

Lenin's ideas on the unity of word and deed have been developed in the CPSU Program and By-Laws in the materials of the party congresses and in the party Central Committee decrees. "Having taken a decision, it is essential to achieve its unswerving fulfillment in the established time," stated the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress.

The decree of the party Central Committee "On Further Improving Control and the Check on Execution in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" demands that all the party organizations systematically review the state of carrying out the party and government directives and steadily implement their own decisions. The decree emphasized that "one of the important tasks of the party apparatus is the carrying out of the adopted decisions and control over the course of their fulfillment."

In the process of preparing for a meeting and in working out a draft decree, the party body proceeds from the fact that the draft should contain precise ideas and tasks, show the ways and means for implementing them, and determine the specific dates and those responsible for carrying out the plans. It is also a good thing when the party committee and party bureau involve experienced activists who are the most competent on one or another question in working out the draft decree. This makes it possible to make the draft decree sound and feasible.

Certainly the critical comments and proposals voiced by the communists should be considered in the final wording and approval of the decree at the meeting. A decree becomes vital when it gives the specific ways to achieve certain goals. If only general wishes such as "improve," "raise" or "ensure" prevail then it is difficult to begin to carry it out and then check on fulfillment.

No matter how informative or concrete a decision may be, it is only an intension or desire of the party organization. In order to carry it out there must be extensive and purposeful organization work.

Approval should be given to such a practice where the secretaries and members of the party committee and bureau literally on the next day after a meeting put their heads together to plan how they should begin to carry out the decree and what measures must be undertaken in order to carry out the proposals of communists approved by the meeting and eliminate the shortcomings noted by them.

Of course, not everything can be done all at once. For this reason it is important to consider the nature of each point of the decree, each proposal and comment. The attention and forces of the aktiv are first focused on the questions which cannot be put off, particularly the measures directly linked to improving the quality of combat and political training and increasing the vigilance, discipline and combat readiness of the unit and subunit. In accord with this, they determine what party assignments should be given to whom and establish the dates for carrying them out. When necessary individual and group instruction is provided for the communists who have been given assignments. Here it is very important to make maximum use of the knowledge, abilities and experience of the communists and to arouse in them a vital and interested attitude toward the assigned job.

Without such thoughtful preparations and painstaking organizational work it is impossible to count on the successful realization of decrees. V. I. Lenin always protested sharply against "haziness and a lack of clarity on the question of what had been assigned to each individual person and against the ensuing complete lack of responsibility."

If the content of the decision is of a long-range nature, as happens in the report and election meetings, it is advisable to draw up a special plan for carrying it out and the fulfillment of this must be kept under supervision. It is important that the party committee and bureau without fail translate all the points of the decree into a language of vital practice. This makes it possible to achieve real results.

For example, the party organizations of a number of units participating in the "Zapad-81" [West-81] Troop and Naval Exercises showed high professionalism and efficiency. In the party meetings responsible tasks were assigned to the communists, such as: by active party political work and by personal example to ensure the high

combat readiness of the units and subunits in acting under conditions close to actual combat. The decisions were made more specific in the assignments to the communists and were embodied in their practical deeds. In all the companies, platoons, teams and squads, in the ship departments, the party members and candidate members systematically explained to the personnel the particular features of the current difficult international situation, the basic goals of the exercises and the combat training tasks of the men of the various specialties, they explained the orders and instructions of the commanders and chiefs to each soldier and sailor and issued combat leaflets.

In creatively applying the experience of party political work acquired during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the secretaries of the party organizations and group organizations issued combat-type assignments to the party members and candidate members, such as: to be examples of valor and military skill in crossing water obstacles and breaking through "enemy" defenses, to surpass the standards in throwing up crossings, in establishing communications, in equipping positions, command posts and so forth. Active and efficient agitation, the impassioned appeal and the personal example of the communists raised the morale of the men and helped to carry out the difficult tasks of the exercises.

The effectiveness of party decisions is measured not by the number of measures carried out but rather by the results of the military and political training of the personnel and by the state of military discipline.

The following instructive example shows this. At the report and election party meeting in the subunit where Officer P. Litvinskiy serves, specific measures were outlined to strengthen the leading role played by the communists in indoctrinating the junior commanders. In carrying out the decree, the communists, with the aid of the Komsomol aktiv, in a short period of time set up a training classroom. Here are to be found the necessary books, pamphlets, well-made stands, posters and other visual aids which are good support in the indoctrination of the sergeants. A seminar was conducted with the junior commanders on the subject "Forms and Methods of Psychological Training for the Personnel." Meetings were held with the veterans of the Great Patriotic War. And most importantly, the communist officers strengthened individual work carried out with the junior commanders and began to provide them with specific aid in the training and indoctrination of subordinates. All of this ultimately had a positive effect upon the quality of the men's military and political training and on strengthening military discipline.

It would be a good thing if each party meeting left such a noticeable trace in the life of the unit or subunit!

Unfortunately, this is not always the case. At times the members of a party committee or bureau seemingly do a lot of work on a draft decree and in preparing a meeting, but after it has been held, they calmly close the file and do not take specific steps to carry out what has been planned. This usually happens not due to any "objective factors" or insurmountable difficulties but rather because of the inertia of certain communists and their insufficiently responsible attitude to the assigned job.

In the party meetings of the air unit X and its subunits, a great deal was said about the need to increase the leading role of the communists in the training and

indoctrination of the flight and technical personnel and in ensuring excellent flight quality and safety. But the decisions adopted on this were not reinforced by organizational work or by increased party and service exactingness and for this reason did not lead to improved work. In subsequent meetings and official conferences, attention was again drawn to the same serious shortcomings which the party decisions had obliged the communists to eliminate.

Obviously here was felt that infamous style which was criticized by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "Often, after a certain decision has not been carried out, a second or sometimes even a third decision is taken on the same questions.... Involuntarily the question arises: is not the new decision on the old subject a sort of concession or a sort of liberalism? Is not exactingness reduced as a result? Such practices must be ended!"

The chief means for combating passivity and formalism is a constant, ably organized check on the execution of the adopted decisions and work plans.

The forms and methods of control are very diverse. But under any conditions it is essential to observe the Leninist principles for a check on execution: systematicness, publicity, the encouraging of positive experience, intolerance of shortcomings, and the combining of exacting control with the providing of comradely aid.

Having planned to carry out various measures, it is very important for the secretary and the members of the party committee or bureau to make certain that the communists who are to carry out the measures are being sufficiently serious in their preparations to carry out the party assignments. If need be, they must be given the necessary help and then personally checked how the planned has been carried out, what results have been achieved and lessons drawn from the positive experience and the individual failures. The constant struggle to carry out party decisions is not only of organizational but also indoctrinational significance. It increases the activity of the party members and candidate members and develops in them a feeling of personal responsibility. On the contrary, closing one's eyes here makes the people let down and gives rise to indifference and a lack of discipline.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Practice of Holding Party Meetings in the Yaroslavl' City Party Organization" (1969) pointed to the need to report regularly at party meetings on the course of carrying out previously adopted decrees and proposals from the communists. Such reports have become part of practice everywhere. But their content and effectiveness are often insufficient. It happens that the secretary of a party committee or bureau merely superficially informs the members of what points of decisions have been carried out and which ones have not. Here no analysis is given of what has been done and the reasons for the nonfulfillment of the planned matters are not gone into. The persons attending the meeting just as dispassionately hurry to "take the information on advice."

The reports and information given by the secretaries of party committees and bureaus bring the greatest benefit when they are accompanied by an exacting reprimand of those who are to blame for the fact that certain decrees have remained unfulfilled.

The hearing of reports by CPSU members and candidate members at meetings and sessions of the party committees and bureaus helps to increase the effectiveness of organizational work by the party organizations. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee

"On Further Improving Control and the Check on Execution in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" has demanded the regular hearing of "reports and information by communists on the work being done by them to implement the adopted decrees and to actively support their initiative and creative undertakings, their professional proposals and comments."

..."He is a dutiful man," are the words used to describe a person who honestly and passionately carries out his official and social duty and in whom word and deed are united. It is essential that this valuable trait be inherent to all communists and particularly those to whom great confidence is placed by the party organizations in the election and report meetings.

Under present-day conditions when the party is focusing on a further rise in work efficiency on all fronts of communist construction, the steadfast carrying out of adopted decisions assumes particular significance. The militancy of the party organizations is strengthened precisely in practical deeds, the maturity of their leaders is tested and honed and the activeness of all those who bear the glorious name of a communist is increased.

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ARMED FORCES

REVIEW OF BOOK ON SOVIET 'GUARDS' UNITS

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[Unattributed review of the book "Sovetskaya gvardiya" (The Soviet Guards) by V. Amel'chenko, Moscow, DOSAAF, 1981, 80 pp, price 15 kopecks]

[Text] The Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF SSSR has recently published the book by the military journalist V. Amel'chenko "Sovetskaya gvardiya." On the basis of archival documents, the memoirs of witnesses and information from participants in the Great Patriotic War, the author has created an interesting tale about the birth of the guards units and their immortal feats.

From the book the reader will learn that on 18 September 1941, four rifle divisions, the 100th, 127th, the 153d and 161st which had excelled in the battles at Yel'nya were given the names of the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th guards divisions. With good reason the formations of the Ground Troops were the first to receive this high name. Precisely they played the most important role in defeating the Nazi invaders. The largest number of men were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in the Ground Troops (8,579 men).

The book describes in detail the service record of the glorious guards formations and it describes how their men stood their difficult but honorable service in the postwar years. They have something to equal. On the colors of the Guards Kante-mirov Division, for example, there are two orders. It was presented with 18 commendations from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The division has 31 Heroes of the Soviet Union and 20,000 men who received orders and medals.

The Taman' guardsmen have held sacred and added to the glorious combat traditions of their unit, they have steadily improved their military skills and observed strict internal order and organization. For successes in military and political training, the division received the Commemorative Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, it properly greeted the 26th Party Congress and has effectively begun to carry out its decisions.

The Soviet government, the book points out, has had high praise for the military feats of the artillery troops. More than 1.6 million men were awarded orders and medals while 1,800 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The colors of more than 800 artillery units are wreathed with combat orders and 515 units and formations have earned the title of guards.

The book has a detailed description of the feat of the experimental rocket launcher battery under the command of Capt I. A. Flerov and it tells about the service record of one of the first formations of the legendary "Katyushas" the Fifth Guards Mortar Division of the Supreme High Command Reserve. This division was baptized in fire at the end of January 1943 at Kastornaya and concluded its heroic march in Berlin.

The book also deals with the guards air formations. The author has given data that the Air Forces and National Air Defense Troops during the war years destroyed around 55,000 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground. Some 2,420 pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union, 65 of them received this title twice, and two of them, A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub, received it three times. Some 288 units and formations were turned into guards ones.

The chapter "Under the Guards Flag" tells of the significant role which our Navy played in achieving victory over the enemy. The Soviet sailors sank 1,245 enemy combat vessels and launches and 1,307 transports. More than 500 sailors received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union while 78 ships and naval units entered the ranks of the Soviet Guards.

In conclusion, the author points out that the present generation of guardsmen, in working to equal the war's heroes, is constantly improving its military skills and is ready at any moment to decisively rebuff the aggressor.

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GROUND FORCES

GERMAN SOURCE ON WEAPONS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES

Tank Modification

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 11, Nov 81, p 626

[Article by r/c: "Soviet T-72 Main Battle Tank Modified Again; Now Upper Armor Plating for the Engine Compartment as Well"]

[Text] Photographs in the Soviet military press, which were published in connection with the "Zapad 81" large-scale maneuver (see number 10/81, p 545), reveal that the Soviets have again modified their T-72 main battle tank. After the first model changes, which showed a modified turret, very probably equipped with a laser rangefinder (see number 11/80, p 662), the most recent model change has improved the tank's protection in the weakest spot until now: The entire engine compartment received armor plating on the upper side, which protects the drive mechanism at least partially against the effects of air-to-surface missiles, cluster bombs with shaped charge effects and in part against area- or target-seeking types of munitions, now only at the development stage, in tube and rocket artillery. The size of the engine compartment cover is about 2.00 x 1.60 m and extends approximately 10 cm over the radiator grille. It is unknown how strong this armor is and of what material it is made. Nevertheless, a 1-cm thick steel plate of this size would weigh about one-quarter ton and could thus have a negative influence on the driving performance of the tank. Furthermore, it is also possible that such a covering interferes with the air exchange of the engine and thereby impairs its efficiency. For this reason one must wait and see whether this is a general model change which has already been initiated or only a test. Our picture shows attacking T-72's with the new upper armor plating. The attack is supported by fighter-bombers of type Su-17/FITTER C.

RPU-14 Multiround Rocket Launcher

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 11, Nov 81, pp 626-627

[Article by r/c: "The RPU-14 140-mm Multiround Rocket Launcher; a Soviet Description"]

[Text] The RPU-14 multiround rocket launcher has been part of the equipment of the Soviet airborne troops since 1964. The rocket-launching battalion of the airborne divisions is equipped with it. Each of the battalion's three batteries



Tank attack during the large-scale Soviet exercise "Zapad 81," supported by fighter aircraft.

possesses six of the truck-towed launchers. The following description of the efficient weapon is taken from the Soviet magazine MILITARY KNOWLEDGE. We reproduce it in an abbreviated, edited translation.

The RPU-14¹⁾ multiround rocket launcher carriage, which is air transportable and can be dropped by parachute, is part of the equipment of the Soviet airborne troops. Among the particular features of the launcher carriage are its great maneuverability and its high rate of fire.

Loaded with 16 rockets it can be moved by a towing vehicle over good roads with a firm surface at a speed of up to 65 km/h. Across short distances it can be hauled by its own crew. For this purpose the launcher carriage is equipped with a special support roller. This is normally fastened on top of the carriage and can be positioned under the cross-bars when needed. This results in a peculiar three-wheeled chassis. Both forms of mobility are of great importance, since they enable the launcher to change position quickly, according to the situation.

Readying it for firing also takes only a few minutes, since the RPU-14 is ready to fire without special preparations and without field fortification. Only the ground spurs have to be anchored in the ground. A well-trained crew thus needs 2 minutes in order to bring the launcher from transport mode to firing position and another 3 minutes in order to load it. In addition, the 16 rockets must be brought up and the igniters put into place.

The shock effect of the launcher is due to the rapid sequential firing of its ammunition: With a 2 shots/second rate of fire it delivers its 16 rockets to the target within about 8 seconds. This gives the shock impact through both its surprise effect and through the explosive action of the rockets.

The construction of the RPU-14 is simple. The launching tubes arranged in four layers of four tubes each aim the rockets and hold them during transportation when the launcher changes position in a loaded condition.

The rockets used are type M-14-OF¹⁾ fragmentation-high-explosive projectiles and type M-14 D²⁾ smoke rounds. The fuses of the fragmentation-high-explosive projectiles are adjustable and can--according to the desired effect at the target--be set with or without delayed action.

In order to reduce the dispersion of the rockets and thereby increase their accuracy and the scoring density of the rounds, the rockets are spin-stabilized, meaning they rotate around their longitudinal axes while in flight. This rotation is achieved by the fact that the axes of the exhaust nozzles of the rocket motors are tilted at a 22° angle from the longitudinal axis of the rocket. A rotation speed of several tens of thousands of revolutions per minute is thus achieved.

1. RPU = Reaktivnaya Puskovaya Ustanovka, meaning rocket launcher carriage.

1. OF = Oskolokhno-Fugasniy, meaning fragmentation-high-explosive-.

2. D = Dymovoy, meaning fog-.



Fig. 1. Section of RPU-14 multi-round rocket launchers in firing position, Soviet crew in NBC protective clothing.

Altogether, the RPU-14 multi-round rocket launcher is a weapon typical of the Soviet rocket artillery. It differs from other multi-round rocket launchers by its ability to be transported by air and dropped by parachute. Based on the resulting high mobility and its tactical-technical features it is capable of performing varied and difficult tasks in modern combat.



Fig. 2. The 140-mm fragmentation-high-explosive rocket

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| a) Launcher carriage in firing position | |
| 1. Motor compartment | 8. Fuse |
| 2. Solid propellant | 9. Arresting screw |
| 3. Initiator | 10. Membrane |
| 4. Combustion chamber bulkhead | 11. Nozzle bulkhead |
| 5. Warhead casing | 12. Seal ring |
| 6. Explosive charge | 13. Rocket igniter |
| 7. Auxiliary igniter | |

(key continued)

Technical data

Launcher Carriage

Weight without rockets:	925 kg
Loaded weight:	1,558 kg
Number of launcher tubes:	16 (4x4)
Tube length:	1,150 mm
Tube diameter:	140.3 mm

Rocket

Total weight:	39.6 kg
Warhead weight:	18.4 kg
Length:	1,085 mm
Maximum range:	9,810 m
Warheads:	M-14 OF fragmentation-high-explosive M-14 D smoke
Firing temperature range:	- 40° to + 50°

New Flamethrower

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 11, Nov 81, p 627

[Article by r/c: "The Soviet Army's New RPO Flamethrower; a Large-Size Hand-Held Flame Cartridge"]

[Text] The use of flamethrowers is still considered very important in the Soviet Army. This is shown by our reports on the flamethrower-equipped T-55 battle tank in numbers 2/79, 3/79, and 11/79, as well as on the use of a modified backpack flamethrower of the same type as the LPO-50 light infantry flamethrower in number 2/81, the basic model of which is also in use with the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies.

A new type of Soviet flamethrower, which was previously unknown by the general public in the West, was recently presented in a sketch (Fig. 1) by the Polish technical press. According to Polish reports, this is a flamethrower in which the incendiary fuel is shot at the target by means of a rocket motor. The combat weapon described as the "RPO¹) recoilless flamethrower" superficially resembles the heavy "Carl Gustav" recoilless gun of the [FRG] Federal Armed Forces. The launch tube has an estimated length of about 1.40 m and a diameter of about 12 cm. It contains the starting and firing mechanism and the aiming mechanism. The ammunition consists of incendiary rounds equipped with stabilizing fins and a propelling charge. Upon firing, the ignitor of the propelling charge is started by an electric impulse and the incendiary round is propelled out of the launch tube by a rocket motor. At this time the ignition flame for the incendiary medium has already been lit. When the incendiary round impacts on the target the fuel is expelled and ignited. The propelling charge gives the incendiary round a theoretical maximum range of 400 m. The effective range for accurate shooting is said to be 190 m.

The Polish technical journal quotes a number of advantages of the recoilless flamethrower over conventional backpack flamethrowers: It offers more safety for the

1. RPO is probably the abbreviation of the Russian term Reaktivnyi Pechotnyi Ognemyot.

Bild 1: Der rückstoßfreie Flammenwerfer RPO (polnische Originalskizze)



Fig. 1. The RPO recoilless flamethrower (original Polish sketch).

crew, is simple to operate and can also be used from combat vehicles and helicopters. In addition, the incendiary fuel is more economically used than by the flame jet thrower and the supply is simplified.

From the scant information by the Polish technical press reproduced above, it can be concluded, that with the RPO flamethrower the principle of the German hand-held flame cartridge has been further developed and considerably improved as regards efficiency, range and accuracy. The new RPO flamethrower thus appears to be an effective means of attacking pockets of resistance and armored vehicles as well as primarily for urban combat, which is becoming increasingly important in densely built-up Central Europe.

It may be assumed that in the Warsaw Pact armies the RPO will replace the portable flamethrower of type LPO-50 (Fig. 2) used up to now, which originated as far back as the early post-war period. Its range is only about 70 m.

1. LPO = Lyogkiy Pechotnyi Ognemyot, meaning light infantry flamethrower.



Fig. 2. LPO-50 backpack flamethrower, here with the National People's Army.

ASU-85 Airborne Assault Gun

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 11, Nov 81, p 628


[Article by rc/dpa: "Airborne ASU-85 Assault Gun With Antiaircraft Machine Gun; 12.7 mm Antiaircraft Machine Gun DSch K on a Ring-Type Mounting"]

[Text] The combat efficiency of the Soviet airborne ASU-85 assault gun has been considerably increased by a model change carried out in the last few years: As confirmed by press photographs of the large-scale Soviet maneuver "Zapad 81," the armament of the airborne assault gun--an 85-mm self-propelled assault cannon and a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun--has been supplemented by a 12.7 mm antiaircraft machine gun DSch K on a ring-type mounting. The ring mount is located over the right-hand hatch intended for the commander.

The ASU-85 was introduced into the Soviet airborne troops at the beginning of the 1960's. The chassis and hull of the 14-ton-heavy vehicle correspond to those of the PT-76 light amphibious tank. It is powered by a water-cooled 176-kW (240 horsepower) diesel engine. This gives the airborne assault gun a maximum speed of 45 km/h and a driving range of 260 km. Although the ASU-85, with 40 mm front

and 15 mm side armor, is relatively thin-skinned, it is capable neither of crossing water nor of being dropped by parachute. The vehicle, which including the gun is about 8.50 m long, 2.80 m wide and 2.10 m high, must be landed with its four-man crew by aircraft or transport helicopter, such as the Mi-6/HOOK or the Mi-10/HARKE.

Using armor-piercing ammunition with high muzzle velocity (HVAP) the ASU-85's assault gun has an armor-penetrating capability of about 120 mm at 1,000 m. Since it is equipped with infrared searchlights and spotlights the airborne assault gun has good night fighting capability. The tank/antitank battalion of the Soviet airborne assault guns. The airborne division of the Polish People's Army is also equipped with the ASU-85. At the "Zapad 81" exercise ASU-85's were deployed in the course of an airborne landing operation, carried out by parts of the airborne division of the Baltic military region, belonging to the "North" exercise group, to support the attack of the "North" group on the rear of the "South" exercise enemy.



Airborne assault gun of type ASU-85 with antiaircraft machine gun deployed in "Zapad 81."

RPG-18 Antitank Grenade Launcher

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 12, Dec 81, p 678

[Article by r/c: "The Soviet RPG-18 Light Antitank Grenade Launcher; First information by the Warsaw Pact Press"]

[Text] The new Soviet grenade launcher, which SOLDAT UND TECHNIK was first able to present in Number 7/81, p 353, as a weapon captured by Afghan resistance fighters, is now subsequently reported on by the National People's Army magazine VOLKSARMEE as well.

According to its information, the RPG-18, conceived as a "disposable weapon"-- National People's Army description: "reactivable antitank grenade"--is said to be substantially supplement antitank defense and to penetrate the protection of all tanks and armored vehicles. The technical data mentioned by VOLKSARMEE differ only insignificantly from those already known in the West. Only the weight of the weapon is indicated as significantly less than previously estimated, apparently because the launching tube is made of glass fiber-reinforced plastic.

In addition to our data in Number 7/81, it can be learned from the National People's Army's description: The antitank grenade launcher can be fired from a lying, kneeling or standing position. The fuse of the shaped-charge grenade is armed from 2 to 15 m after leaving the tube. The fuse consists of a nose unit with a piezo-electric device as well as a tail unit with an electric spark generator. Should the electrical mechanism fail or if the grenade does not hit a target after a flight of 4 to 6 seconds, the fuse, and thus the grenade, will detonate by itself.




Fig. 1a: RPG-18 in collapsed state (transport mode).

Fig. 1b: Cut-away model of the collapsed RPG-18. Note the shaped-charge grenade similar to that of the RPG-7.

Fig. 2a: RPG-18 extended for firing.

Fig. 2b: Cut-away model of the extended RPG-18.

Key continued

- a = trigger and safety catch
- b = rear sight
- c = folding front sight with distance markings
- d = front tube cap
- 2 = rear tube cap

The folding front sight at the front end of the tube is equipped with target markings (red triangles) for the distances of 50 m, 100 m, 150 m and 200 m. Each launcher tube has a stick-on label, which by means of text and sketches explains the operation of the weapon and the safety regulations which must be observed. The latter require in particular:

- a) Firing is prohibited when there are persons in a 90° sector and closer than 30 m behind the weapon.
- b) Firing is prohibited if there are obstacles closer than 2 m in front of the weapon or if the height of the line of fire is less than 20 cm.
- c) If the inner tube has been extended for firing, it may under no circumstances be pushed in again.
- d) When changing position the extended weapon must be put on safety.
- e) Extracting the shaped-charge grenade or dismantling the weapon is prohibited.

In contrast to the PRG-7 antitank grenade launcher, the RPG-18 is not tied to a specific person, meaning a weapon intended solely for the antitank gunners provided for in the organization plan: All soldiers are to be trained in its use, in order to multiply the antitank capabilities at close range.

For training purposes a training antitank grenade launcher (RPG-18 Ueb) with a dummy warhead and fuse is used. For use by airborne troop units the RPG-18 is provided with a cover which protects it during the parachute drop.

Only with certain restrictions, however, can the new antitank grenade launcher be said to be a "disposable weapon:" "In the interest of saving material," it says in best official German in the National People's Army magazine, "the empty tubes should be recovered and returned."

Caliber:	64 mm
Tube length in closed state (transport mode):	704 mm
Tube length in extended state (firing mode):	1,050 mm
Initial speed of grenade:	114 m/s
Range in direct fire (target height 2 m)	135 m
Maximum sighting range:	200 m
Time needed to prepare for firing:	8 to 10 s

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LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

CHEMICAL DEFENSE TROOPS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 11, 1980 pp 651-652

[Text] The Soviet armed forces get a high priority on their chemical warfare defense: they conduct the atomic and chemical defense training in all their branches with what seems to be greater emphasis than in any other army in the world and at all command levels from regiment to front have at their disposal well-equipped NBC-defense units.

The NBC-defense troops designated as "Chemical Troops" have the tasks of:

- maintaining NBC reconnaissance and warning of existing or threatening NBC incursions;
- exploring and marking off contaminated areas;
- creating passages through contaminated areas or exploring and marking detours;
- supporting other branches with the decontamination of personnel and material;
- assuring the supply of NBC defense material to other branches and
- assisting them with NBC defense training.

In addition to this the Chemical Troops are responsible for the technical execution of smoke and flame operations. Included among the Chemical Troops are:

- the "Chemical Companies" of motorized infantry and armored regiments and airborne divisions;
- the "Chemical Battalions" of the motorized infantry and armored divisions;
- the "Chemical Battalions" of the armies (= US corps strength).
- the "Chemical Brigades" of the fronts (= US army strength).

In addition an NBC reconnaissance section is included in the ground combat regiments and in the reconnaissance battalions of the divisions.

While at regimental command level priorities are fixed on NBC warning, reconnaissance and exploration functions, the Chemical Battalions at division and corps level are mainly responsible for the decontamination of personnel and material. They are consequently made up, in addition to an NBC reconnaissance element, of three decontamination companies ("Companies for Special Employment"), which are equipped for decontamination of personnel and equipment.

The "Chemical Brigade" of the army command is organized into three decontamination battalions and one NBC reconnaissance battalion. Their units can be detached for service with other NBC units in other commands affected by hostile NBC action. The following major equipment elements are included in the equipment establishment of Soviet NBC-defense troops:

- decontamination vehicles of the type DDA (Disinfection and Shower Vehicles) for the decontamination of personnel, clothing and equipment,
- decontamination vehicles of the type ARS (Spraying Vehicle) for the decontamination of larger pieces of equipment and terrain,
- turbo-jet decontamination apparatus of the type TMS (Self-Propelled Heat Machines) for the rapid decontamination of armored combat vehicles and heavy weapons.

The decontamination vehicle DDA, which exists in a number of configurations now in use, consists of 2 steam chambers each with 1.8 m³ capacity, an oil fired hot water boiler of 250 l capacity, a shower installation for 12 persons, containers for the decontamination agent and the heating oil as well as the requisite hoses and accessories. The vehicle is dependent upon natural water sources, pipelines or tank trucks for water resupply.

In the steam chambers, clothing and equipment are decontaminated by high-temperature steam and admixed chemicals. The chambers are set for a maximal temperature of 100°C and a maximal pressure of 4 kg/cm². The shower installation is designed for the decontamination of personnel. It is fed from the hot water boiler and is set up in tents especially transported for this purpose. As a basis vehicle the 2 t truck (4x4) GAZ-63 or GAZ-66 as well as the 4.5 t truck (4x4) ZIL-130 (with the operating elements contained in a box-like structure).

The decontamination vehicle ARS consists of a 2500 l tank for decontamination liquid, a vehicle-motor-driven pump with 300 to 400 l/m delivery capacity, a hand pump, the distribution and connection assembly and various hose and spray units.

For the decontamination of roads and terrain a broadly spraying nozzle is set at the front or (in the case of older models) at the rear of the vehicle and connected to the liquid tank. The vehicle is driven slowly through the affected sector while a roughly 5 m wide path is decontaminated. A single tank suffices for a path of some 500 m length.

Connections are provided for eight 18-meter-long thin hoses for the decontamination of vehicles, weapons and equipment. Jet or spray nozzles can be fixed to these as well as scrub brushes attached. By this means up to four vehicles or eight smaller pieces of equipment can be contaminated simultaneously. One tankful is sufficient for the decontamination of 12 to 15 combat or transport vehicles. Four connections for heavier hoses serve for the decontamination of buildings, for filling smaller pieces of decontamination equipment or for firefighting. Hoses, nozzles and other fittings are carried in chests attached to the side of the fluid tank. Frequently drums with decontamination agents will be attached to these chests.

As a basis vehicle for the older ARS models (ARS-12 D and ARS-12 U), the 4.5 truck 6x6) ZIL-151 and the ZIL-157 (Ill. 2), is used, while for the more modern ARS-14 the 3.5 t (6x6) ZIL-131 truck is employed.

The turbo-jet decontamination apparatus TMS consists of a modified jet aircraft propulsion assembly of the type VK-1, which is mounted on a rotating platform together with the operator's cabin; it can be shifted horizontally and vertically by means of a hydraulic mechanism. Between the driver's cabin of the 4.5 t (6x6) URAL-375 truck which serves as the basis vehicle, and the rotating platform, two 1500 l tanks are arranged in tandem, one of which holds the fuel for the operating mechanism and the other containing the decontamination fluid. Water is transported in a 4000 l tank trailer.

The decontamination takes effect through the heat of the exhaust gas jet of the operating mechanism, to which--depending upon the type of contamination--water or decontamination fluid is admixed. Two turbo-jet apparatuses are used for decontamination. The vehicles to be decontaminated are driven slowly between them (Ill. 4) and are sprayed from both sides.

Conversely the turbo-jet apparatuses can be driven along the column of vehicles to be decontaminated. By this time is gained for the individual decontamination of the drivers, in the event that this is necessary. Using the turbo-jet apparatuses--depending upon the type and severity of the contamination--the armored vehicles of a tank battalion can be decontaminated in 30 to 90 minutes.

For smoke employment the Soviet NBC-defense troops--apparently only at corps- and army level--have available smoke generator vehicles on the basis of the 2 t (4x4) GAZ-63 truck or its successor type GAZ-66. A smoke generator vehicle produces an oil smoke screen some 800 to 1000 m long of some 100 m depth (Ill. 3). The smoke oil carried by the vehicle is sufficient for approximately 4 hours' use.

The other Warsaw Pact states, in particular Poland and the GDR, have developed a series of their own decontamination apparatuses on the basis of domestically produced vehicles, which in principle, however, correspond in construction and operation to those of the Soviet Union. Only Czechoslovakia has developed its own turbo-jet decontamination apparatus (Ill. 5). It bears the designation TZ-74.

Bild 1: Dekontaminierungsfahrzeug DDA-53 A




Bild 2: Dekontaminierungsfahrzeug ARS-12 U



Bild 3: Nebelgenerator-Fahrzeuge beim Legen einer Nebelwand



Bild 4: Turbostrahl-Dekontaminierungsgerät TMS-65 im Einsatz



Bild 5: Turbostrahl-Dekontaminierungsgerät TZ-54 auf Lkw TATRA-148



Captions

- Illustration 1--Decontamination Vehicle DDA-53 A
Illustration 2--Decontamination Vehicle ARS-12 U
Illustration 3--Smoke Generator Vehicles Laying Down A Smoke Screen
Illustration 4--Turbo-Jet Decontamination Apparatus TMS-65 In Action
Illustration 5--Turbo-Jet Decontamination Apparatus Mounted On TATRA-148

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